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Abstract
Due to the unknown future economic situation of students, private banks are unwill-
ing to provide student loans in the absence of collateral. This market failure requires
government intervention to prevent socially sub-optimal and regressive outcomes.
Income contingent loans, whose repayment depends on the borrowers' future capac-
ity to pay, can oer a possible solution to this problem. In this paper, we compare
alternative income contingent loans for nancing tuition fees at German universities.
Several German states have introduced tuition fees at their universities since sum-
mer 2007 and publicly owned banks have started to oer student loans to cover these
fees. Our empirical ndings highlight the benets of income contingent loans and
demonstrate that tuition fees at German universities could increase considerably if
an income contingent loan system would be implemented to provide students with
the nancial resources they need to pay these fees.
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Despite the high demand for qualied people in the German economy, government
spending on tertiary education in Germany is below the OECD average (OECD,
2010). Although the German government recognizes the need for larger investments
in higher education of young generations, the nancial scope in the presence of
unprecedented public debt and declining tax revenue is rather small. Several German
states have introduced tuition fees of up to e500 per semester since summer 2007 to
cover a small fraction of the annual cost of about e7,000 per student and publicly
owned banks have started to oer student loans to nance these fees.1
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to student nancing that in-
volves the design of income contingent loans (ICLs) for nancing tuition fees, similar
to Australia's Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and the student loan
system of the UK. We examine the case in which annual tuition fees at German
universities increase to e3,500 per student to cover about 50% of the total cost.2
The attraction of ICLs is that they can be designed to avoid many of the prob-
lems associated with alternative nancing policies. First, there is no concern with
intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is universal. That is, no students would
be denied access through the imposition of means-testing arrangements that could
exclude some whose parents or partners are unwilling to help.
Second, given an ecient collection mechanism, there is no default issue as such
for the government. That is, if the tax system works well and is used to collect the
debt, it is extremely dicult for the vast majority of graduates to avoid repayment.
There is a form of a default issue in that some students will not pay back in full,
because ICLs are designed to excuse some former students' payments when their
1According to the Federal Statistical Oce (2008), the average annual public expendi-
ture on tertiary education per student in 2005 was e7,180.
2This amount is comparable to the current maximum tuition fee of £3,290
(about e4,000) for the 2010/2011 academic year in the UK.
1lifetime incomes are low. Other reasons loans may not be repaid include death and
emigration.
Third, because repayments depend on income, there should be no concern for
students with respect to incapacity to repay, or repayment hardships due to low
income. Once an individual's income determines repayment, and so long as the
repayment parameters are suciently generous, the students' prospects of default or
repayment hardship are eliminated. This is the critical practical advantage of ICLs {
unlike other forms of assistance the arrangement provides insurance against default
and repayment diculties.
ICLs have signicant advantages over alternative nancing arrangements in that
they can be designed to avoid the major problems of their alternatives. However, as
noted above, it is essential that there is an ecient collection mechanism to make
an ICL operational and eective. While most OECD countries will have income tax
or social security systems that enable ecient collection of income contingent debts,
it is unlikely that the majority of developing countries has the capacity to meet the
requirements for a successful ICL. There is no doubt that the German income tax
system is suciently sophisticated to allow ecacious ICL collection.
The following analysis focuses on two important elements of ICLs: implicit inter-
est rate subsidies (which result from the collection of low or no interest and constitute
a cost to the taxpayer) and repayment burdens (the share of a person's income that
is needed to service the debt). These elements, which are described in detail below,
allow us to draw inferences about the eciency of alternative loan schemes. Our anal-
ysis departs from a consideration of implicit interest rate subsidies of conventional
loan schemes that are based on current design parameters. In order to calculate
repayment burdens, we use data from the German Microcensus 2007, which consti-
tutes an excellent data source for the purpose of our analysis because it includes a
large representative sample of university graduates in Germany. To calculate repay-
ment 
ows, we estimate age-earnings proles, using linear and unconditional quantile
regression models. We dierentiate between men and women residing in East and
West Germany and calculate separate repayment 
ows for university graduates and
2PhDs. The estimates obtained from the regression models allow us to compare im-
plicit interest rate subsidies and repayment burdens of conventional loans and ICLs
across the earnings distribution.
Our empirical ndings highlight the benets of ICLs and demonstrate that tu-
ition fees at German universities could increase considerably if ICLs would be im-
plemented to provide students with the nancial resources they need to pay these
fees. Our ndings further suggest that conventional loans would either produce very
high interest rate subsidies or unacceptable repayment burdens if annual tuition fees
would increase to e3,500 per student, while ICLs can exhibit both low interest rate
subsidies and low repayment burdens. Depending on the implicit interest rate sub-
sidy and the default rates of the respective ICL, higher tuition fees could generate
a public revenue of about e3-4 billion per year if they were introduced at all public
universities in Germany.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the concept of implicit
interest rate subsidies and repayment burdens. Section 3 outlines relevant aspects of
institutional conditions in the German context and discusses the design of alternative
loan schemes. A description of the data and a discussion of age-earnings proles is
given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses design issues for ICLs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Interest Rate Subsidies and Repayment Bur-
dens
2.1 Interest Rate Subsidies
The eciency of a loan system depends on its recoverability which may be reduced
by intended and unintended subsidies. An interest rate subsidy is typically the unin-
tended consequence of the design of a nancing scheme. To distinguish interest rate
subsidies from other intended tuition fee subsidies, they are usually called \implicit
interest rate subsidies". An implicit interest rate subsidy is dened as the dierence
between the present value of the tuition fee paid through the loan scheme (PVF) and










(1 + )d = PVF   PVR;
where Ft is the tuition fee paid in year t (t = 1;:::;T), Rd is the loan repayment in
year d (d = T + 1;:::;T + D) and  is the discount rate. The share of the present
value of the tuition fee that is repaid through the loan scheme is given by




This share may be considered as a benchmark that allows comparisons of the relative
scal burden of alternative loan schemes. The implicit interest rate subsidy is equal
to zero if the nominal debts are repaid in full using a real rate of interest equal to
the discount rate of the government. In this case, the present value of the tuition fee
equals the present value of the repayment 
ow. The subsidy will be positive, however,
if the real rate of interest is less than the discount rate because the resulting loan
repayment will take longer and the present value of repayment will be reduced.
2.2 Repayment Burdens
The repayment burden of a loan is the share of a person's income needed to service





Repayment burdens are important for the comparison of student loans. A greater
repayment burden allows less consumption and/or savings at a given income and
increases the likelihood that debtors default on loan repayments. Woodhall (1987)
highlights the trade-o between taxpayer interest rate subsidies and former students'
repayment burdens and mentions the possibility that lower interest rate subsidies can
increase default probabilities and ultimately result in higher taxpayer contributions.
ICLs are explicitly designed to avoid high repayment burdens. However, the
proportion of a debtor's income to which repayment burdens should be limited to
remains unclear. Based on an extensive body of literature, Baum and Schwartz
4(2006) suggest that the repayment of student loans should not exceed 8 percent of
the gross income of a former student. The design of all ICLs presented in this paper
is based on a repayment burden of 6 percent.
3 Institutional Setting and Student Loan Design
3.1 Student Loans for Tuition Fees in Germany
In 2009/2010, almost 250,000 students started to study at one of the 110 universi-
ties in Germany. Less than 11,000 students currently attend one of the 10 private
universities, while the total number of students at German universities is about 1.4
million. About 11 percent of the students at German institutions of higher education
are foreign-born.3 Since German universities used to be free for all students (except
for a lump-sum fee for administrative and other purposes), student loans used to
focus exclusively on the funding of student's living expenses.4
Tuition fees of up to e500 per semester were introduced in the following seven
states since summer 2007: Baden-W urttemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower
Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland. The introduction of these fees was
very unpopular and led to student protests at many universities. In summer 2008,
general tuition fees were abolished in Hesse because they were considered uncon-
stitutional. At the same time, Hamburg eliminated the need for a student loan to
nance tuition fees by starting to collect a general tuition fee of e375 per semester
after the end of the study period. Finally, after state elections in Saarland, a new
coalition abolished general tuition fees in summer 2010.
As a result of the introduction of tuition fees, publicly owned banks oer student
3Both the Federal Statistical Oce (http://www.destatis.de) and the association
of universities and other higher education institutions (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz,
http://www.hochschulkompass.de) regularly publish the most recent student and univer-
sity numbers on their websites.
4The Federal Training Assistance Act (Bundesausbildungsf orderungsgesetz or BAf oG)
that regulates student loans for nancing living expenses focuses on students from low-
income households. The eligibility for these student loans typically depends on the parents'
income. A more detailed discussion of these loans is beyond the scope of this paper.
5loans to cover these fees. Table 1 gives an overview of these loans.5 In general,
all students are eligible for a loan if general tuition fees are collected in their state.
However, there are age limits in all states that vary between 35 years in Lower Saxony
and 60 years in North Rhine-Westphalia. In addition, students may only receive a
loan for up to 2 years after their regular period of study (which depends on the eld
of study). Foreign students are usually only eligible if they either come from an EU
member state, have received their university-entrance diploma in Germany, or are
recognized as refugees or asylum seekers.
The loan repayment typically starts after the end of a deferment period, which
lasts between 1.5 and 2 years and monthly repayment installments vary between e20
and e150. Nominal interest rates also vary considerably across states (see Table 1)
and upper limits are not guaranteed for the entire study period. Table 1 further
reports an upper debt limit, which constitutes the highest amount that has to be
repaid. Since this debt limit may also include loans that were provided for nancing
living expenses, former students who have received a suciently high loan for their
living expenses do not have to pay back the loan they received for tuition fees.
The student loans provide default insurance, i.e. they do not have to be repaid
if the individual (monthly) net income is below a certain threshold (see Table 1).
Specically, former students with a suciently low income can apply for postponing
their payment. Loan defaults due to income and repayment limits are being nanced
through the tuition fees themselves and universities have to pay a part of their
revenue into a default fund.
3.2 The Design of Student Loans
Although existing student loans appear to work if tuition fees are suciently low, it
seems likely that they perform less well if tuition fees increase considerably because
higher tuition fees result in longer repayment durations and/or higher repayment
burdens. Departing from the loans currently oered by publicly owned banks, we
5Detailed information about public loans for nancing tuition fees at German universities
is provided on http://www.studis-online.de and http://www.bafoeg-aktuell.de.
6may ask the question: \How would the repayments look like if tuition fees would
increase but the rates of repayment would stay the same?" To address this question,
we design hypothetical loans based on current repayment 
ows. Since the monthly
repayment rate of a student loan typically varies between e50 and e150 in most
states (with the exception of Bavaria, where the minimum rate is only e20), we
consider monthly repayment rates of e50 and e150 (i.e. annual repayment rates
of e600 and e1,800) as two extreme cases of conventional loans. We will later
compare these conventional loans to alternative ICLs.
The design of both the conventional and the income contingent loan schemes
relies on a number of (weak) assumptions about the size of relevant parameters.
Specically, we assume a discount rate of 3 percent per annum in real terms for the
calculation of present values.6 The tuition fee is set to e17,500 for a 5-year study
period.7 We consider the case in which former students start to repay the loan after
the end of a 3-year deferment period if their income is above the tax-free amount. In
2007, unmarried persons did not pay taxes if their annual income was below e7,671.8
Given these parameters, we consider three schemes that depend on the choice of the
real interest rate and a tuition surcharge:
- Scheme 1: 0 percent real interest, no surcharge,
- Scheme 2: 0 percent real interest, 25 percent surcharge,
- Scheme 3: 3 percent real interest, no surcharge.
Introducing a 25 percent surcharge is similar to Australia's HECS arrangement ex-
cept for one important dierence: The HECS system provides a 20 percent discount
6This rate corresponds approximately to the return of a long-term government bond
(Bundesanleihe).
7We further assume that PhDs study three years longer than other university graduates
without paying additional tuition fees.
8As a result of the sharp discontinuity in the taxable income, university graduates may
face a very high eective marginal tax rate at this threshold. In the Australian context,
Chapman and Leigh (2009) nd that taxpayers bunch below this repayment threshold
but that the eect is economically small, suggesting that the sharp discontinuity in the
repayment threshold is no problem for the design of ICLs.
7for an upfront payment of the tuition obligation, implying a 25 percent surcharge for
graduates who choose to take the debt (Chapman and Lounkaew, 2009).9
To investigate interest rate subsidies and repayment burdens of conventional loan
schemes (similar to those currently oered by publicly owned banks), we start by
designing two hypothetical loans based on current repayment rates that vary be-
tween e600 (type a) and e1,800 (type b) per year. The repayments of the conven-
tional schemes are presented in Figure 1. We assume that the two loans are being
repaid according to Scheme 1 and label them Scheme 1a and Scheme 1b, respectively.
Using the assumptions about the size of relevant parameters outlined above, we con-
sider two additional repayment schemes for each loan that either include a tuition
surcharge of 25 percent (Schemes 2a and 2b) or a real rate of interest of 3 percent
(Schemes 3a and 3b). To allow comparisons across schemes, we hold repayment du-
rations constant. As a result, the repayment duration of Schemes 1a through 3a is 28
years, while it takes 10 years to repay the loan according to Schemes 1b through 3b.
Since we hold the repayment durations constant, the repayment rates increase
across schemes. Specically, while the repayment rate of Scheme 1a is e600, a
repayment rate of e750 is needed to repay the loan according to Scheme 2a. The re-
payment rate of Scheme 3a is e1,075 for graduates without and e1,175 for graduates
with a PhD. Introducing a tuition surcharge of 25 percent increases the repayment
rate of e1,800 (Scheme 1b) to e2,100 (Scheme 2b), while a real rate of interest of 3
percent results in a repayment rate of e2,400 for graduates without and e2,600 for
graduates with a PhD.
Due to the long repayment duration of Schemes 1a through 3a, annual repayments
of less than e1,200 appear to be rather unrealistic because it seems likely that most
university graduates do not want to repay their student loans beyond the age of 55
years. In contrast, Schemes 1b through 3b represent realistic examples for nancing
annual tuition fees of e3,500 over a ve-year period through a conventional loan with
9A 20 percent discount corresponds to and 25 percent surcharge because a charge
of e1,000 can be avoided by paying e800. Students paying later take on an addi-
tional e200/e800=25 percent.
8a repayment duration of 10 years. Since the ICLs that will be designed in Section 5
have a repayment duration of about 10-15 years, our discussion of conventional loans
will focus predominantly on Schemes 1b through 3b.
3.3 Interest Rate Subsidies of Conventional Loans
Table 2 includes the implicit interest rate subsidies of the conventional loan schemes.
We nd sizable dierences in interest rate subsidies across schemes. Specically, the
implicit interest rate subsidy of a conventional loan with a real rate of interest of zero
percent and no surcharge is between 30 and 50 percent. Imposing a surcharge of 25
percent reduces the interest rate subsidy considerably. In particular, the interest
rate subsidy of Scheme 2b is only 15-22 percent. As discussed earlier, there is no
subsidy if the real rate of interest is set to 3 percent, which equals the discount rate
of the government.
Faster repayment improves the recoverability of the loan if the real rate of interest
is lower than the discount rate. Consequently, the subsidies of Schemes 1b and 2b
are lower than the respective subsidies of Schemes 1a and 2a. On balance, these
numbers reveal that implicit interest rate subsidies of a loan can be very high if the
real rate of interest is below the discount rate of the government. However, interest
rate subsidies may be reduced considerably by imposing a surcharge. In contrast
to ICLs, interest rate subsidies of conventional loans are constant across the entire
population of university graduates because the repayments of these loans are not
income contingent.
4 Data and Predicted Earnings Functions
4.1 Data
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the German Microcensus 2007, an an-
nual representative cross-sectional survey of 1 percent of all German households col-
lected by the German Federal Statistical Oce. The data set includes information
9about the population structure, the economic and social situation of the population,
families, consensual unions and households, employment, job search, (continuing)
education/training, the housing situation and health. The Microcensus constitutes
an excellent data source for the purpose of our analysis, because it includes a large
sample of university graduates and allows a construction of all relevant variables.
However, due to the design of the survey and the questionnaire, assumptions have to
be made to construct the income variables that are needed for the empirical analy-
sis. Specically, information about the monthly net income of employed individuals
is used to generate two relevant dependent variables: \annual gross earnings" and
\hourly gross wages". The monthly gross income is obtained by using an online in-
come tax calculator for the year 2007.10 We dene annual gross earnings as 12 times
the monthly gross income, while hourly gross wages are obtained by dividing the
monthly gross income by the number of working hours per month.11
In order to investigate the overall impact of income contingent loans and allow
comparisons between individuals with and without university degree, we impose very
few sample restrictions. Specically, we restrict our sample to German citizens be-
tween 26 and 65 years of age. We further drop persons who are either self-employed,
in the military or working as civil servants. We also remove employed persons with-
out positive income. After dropping all observations with missing values on one
of the variables used in our analysis, our sample includes 70,019 men and 78,201
women residing in West Germany as well as 20,967 men and 22,428 women residing
in East Germany. 54,251 men and 48,938 women in West Germany as well as 14,088
men and 13,932 women in East Germany are employed. The sub-sample of univer-
sity graduates (both employed and not employed) consists of 7,459 men 6,447 and
women in West Germany and 2,224 men and 2,085 women in East Germany.
Table 3 includes summary statistics for the sample of both employed and not em-
10See http://www.parmentier.de/steuer/incometax.htm. The monthly gross income is
calculated separately for single and married households with and without children.
11The Microcensus includes information about \actual" and \normal" (contractual)
working hours. We focus on the number of normal working hours as long as it is be-
low the reported number of actual working hours. The number of actual working hours is
considered if it exceeds the number of normal working hours.
10ployed individuals. The numbers do not only reveal sizable dierences between men
and women but also between West and East Germany. In particular, dierences in
the labor markets of the two regions persist even two decades after the reunication.
Considerable earnings dierentials do not only exist between men and women but
also between West and East Germany. Moreover, while almost 78 percent of the
26-65 year old men are employed in West Germany, the corresponding employment
rate is only 67.3 percent in East Germany. At the same time, the labor force partic-
ipation rate of women is about 63 percent both in West and East Germany. Despite
the large earnings dierential, the numbers do not suggest that the East German
population is less educated than the West German population. Instead, women in
East Germany are on average better educated than women in West Germany. Over-
all, these numbers highlight considerable dierences between men and women in the
two regions. For that reason, our empirical analysis is performed separately for these
four groups.
The numbers in Table 4 refer to the sample of employed and not employed uni-
versity graduates. Again, we distinguish between men and women in West and East
Germany. We nd that average earnings of male graduates in West Germany are
much higher than those of male graduates in East Germany. While female graduates
earn less than male graduates, the earnings dierential between female graduates in
West and East Germany is rather small. Female labor force participation among
graduates is about 78 percent in both regions, while the employment rate among
male graduates is about 88 percent in West Germany and 80 percent in East Ger-
many. Finally, Table 4 includes the distribution of graduates across disciplines. The
numbers suggest that graduates in East Germany were much more likely to study
sciences, while a larger share of West German graduates focused on education. A
higher share of male graduates in West Germany studied business, while the share
of female business graduates is slightly higher in East Germany. Dierences in the
distribution across other disciplines are rather small.
114.2 Predicted Earnings Functions
In order to calculate the repayment 
ow of an income contingent loan, we estimate
the age-earnings prole for each subgroup by employing a standard earnings regres-
sion model which includes a set of indicator variables for dierent levels of education
and a quadratic function of age. A methodological problem arises from the nonlin-
ear nature of the dependent variables because income is measured in brackets rather
than on a continuous scale. For that reason, interval regressions represent the most
appropriate way of estimating our earnings functions. However, accounting for non-
linearity causes several methodological problems that have to be addressed. First,
hourly gross wages cannot be constructed without additional assumptions. Second,
the interval regression model does not always achieve convergence, which prevents
us from estimating earnings functions for all sub-samples. Third, the interval regres-
sion model inhibits distributional analyses because it may only be used to estimate
mean eects of the regressors on the dependent variable. Fortunately, the number
of income brackets is suciently large (there are 24 categories) to justify the use of
mean points and to estimate linear rather than interval regression models.12
The predicted average age-earnings proles for the four groups are presented in
Figure 2.13 Within each of the four groups, we dierentiate between individuals with
and without university degree. We further distinguish between university graduates
with and without a PhD. All gures show that average earnings increase over the
life cycle (and slightly decrease in old age). Moreover, the age-earnings proles start
at dierent points of the life cycle and at dierent levels, depending on educational
attainment. For simplicity, we assume that individuals with a university degree start
to work at age 29, while those with a PhD start at age 32. While average annual
earnings of individuals without university degree remain relatively low over the entire
12A comparison of linear and interval regression estimates (in cases where convergence
could be achieved) suggests that there are no qualitative dierences in the results between
the two approaches and that quantitative dierences are relatively small. The estimates of
the interval regression models are available from the authors upon request.
13The age-earnings proles were derived from earnings functions similar to those pre-
sented in Tables A1 and A2 of the appendix. Our estimates provide strong evidence for
signicant private returns to education and an inverted U-shaped age-earnings prole.
12life cycle (below e35,000 for men in West Germany and below e20,000 for the
remaining groups), earnings of graduates increase to about e25,000-60,000 around
age 43. Annual earnings of graduates with a PhD even increase to about e35,000-
85,000 around age 50. In sum, the predicted earnings functions presented in Figure 2
do not only suggest that graduates have much higher earnings than non-graduates
but also reveal that the earnings of graduates increase substantially over the life
cycle. The age-earnings proles of graduates constitute the starting point for the
calculation of loan repayments and implicit interest rate subsidies that we discuss
below.
4.3 Unconditional Quantile Results
Since age-earnings proles may dier considerably across the earnings distribution,
we extend our calculation of age-earnings proles beyond the mean. To estimate the
age-earnings proles at certain quantiles of the distribution, we employ unconditional
quantile regressions based on so-called \recentered in
uence functions" (Firpo et al.,
2009). Since unconditional quantile regression estimates capture the eect of the
change in the regressors on the quantile of the unconditional distribution of the
dependent variable, we may use them to predict age-earnings proles at dierent
quantiles of the earnings distribution. A distributional analysis is crucial in the
context of student loans because repayment burdens are typically most important
for debtors with low incomes.
The uncondtitional quantile regression estimates for the 25th, 50th and 75th per-
centiles of the earnings distribution of men and women in West and East Germany
are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix. The estimates show substantial
heterogeneity in the returns to a university degree or a PhD across the distribu-
tion and with regard to gender and region. The returns to education of university
graduates are particularly low at the 25th percentile, suggesting that the predicted
age-earnings proles will be relatively low at the bottom of the earnings distribu-
tions. Considerable dierences may also be observed between the quadratic functions
13that describe the relationship between age and earnings. Specically, an increase in
age has a relatively small eect on earnings at the 25th percentile (the eect is even
negative for women in West Germany), indicating that debtors with low incomes
may face high repayment burdens in the presence of a conventional loan scheme.
4.4 Repayment Burdens of the Conventional Loan Scheme
Consumption smoothing constitutes a critical element of ICLs. In the absence of
consumption smoothing, borrowers with low income may have to use a considerable
proportion of their income to repay a loan. Since earnings typically increase over the
life cycle, conventional loans exhibit high repayment burdens during the rst years
of the repayment period, resulting in high default probabilities.
Table 5 reports the repayment burdens for the conventional Scheme 3b over the
rst ve years of the repayment period. The numbers reveal that university graduates
with average earnings face repayment burdens of 7-16 percent in the rst year of the
repayment period, clearly exceeding the \8 percent rule" advocated by Baum and
Schwartz (2006). The repayment burdens are much higher at the 25th percentile
of the earnings distribution, ranging from 11-77 percent at the beginning of the
repayment period. In contrast, the repayment burdens are relatively low (between 4
and 10 percent) at the 75th percentile of the earnings distribution, suggesting that
many university graduates at the top of the distribution could repay their student
loans much faster.
The numbers in Table 5 explain why currently existing conventional student loans
do not leave much room for higher tuition fees. ICLs are needed to broaden the
scope for tuition fees at German universities and to provide both default insurance
and consumption smoothing.
145 Design Issues for an Income Contingent Loan
Scheme
5.1 Alternative Interest Rate Regimes
Figures 3 and 4 include the average repayment 
ows for the three schemes described
earlier. Due to increasing earnings over the life cycle, the repayments increase with
higher age. In all cases, the loans are repaid by the age of 50. However, there
is substantial heterogeneity in the repayment duration, depending on the scheme
and the group that is considered. As a result of the large earnings dierentials
discussed earlier (see Table 4), male graduates can repay their loans faster than
female graduates and the repayment duration in East Germany is longer than in
West Germany. The repayment duration further increases if a 25 percent surcharge
is imposed and is even longer if a 3 percent rate of real interest is levied. In all
cases, we assume that graduates start to repay their loans later if they have a PhD.
However, due to the earnings dierential between graduates with and without a PhD,
the repayment duration is reduced if a graduate holds a PhD.
5.2 Interest Rate Subsidies
The implicit interest rate subsidies for the three schemes are presented in Table 6.
Since we are not only interested in subsidies of average university graduates, we also
perform similar calculations at other points of the earnings distribution using un-
conditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al., 2009). We use the estimates to predict
the age-earnings proles across the distribution and to calculate repayment burdens
and implicit interest rate subsidies. Investigating subsidies across the distribution is
relevant because ICLs require no repayments if debtors experience suciently low
earnings.
The numbers in Table 6 reveal considerable dierences in interest rate subsi-
dies between the three schemes and across the distribution. While the interest rate
subsidy of average graduates is about 30-35 percent for an ICL with a real rate of in-
15terest of zero percent and no surcharge, the subsidy is substantially lower (between 13
and 23 percent) if a 25 percent surcharge is imposed.
Sizable dierences in interest rate subsidies may also be observed across the
earnings distribution. In particular, subsidies at the bottom of the distribution are
larger than those observed at the mean or the median, while subsidies at the top of
the distribution are lower. The interest rate subsidies decline at higher quartiles of
the distribution because graduates with higher earnings can repay their loans faster
than those with low earnings. Faster repayment improves the recoverability of the
loan if the real rate of interest is lower than the discount rate. In almost all cases,
interest rate subsidies of West German women are equal to 100 percent at the bottom
of the distribution, suggesting that female graduates in West Germany, who are at or
below the 25th percentile of their earnings distribution, are unable to repay the loan.
Finally, while we observe large dierences in interest rate subsidies between ICLs
and across earnings distributions, dierences between graduates with and without a
PhD are rather small. We also nd that interest rate subsidies of graduates in West
and East Germany are about the same (with the exception of the low-income female
graduates mentioned above).
6 Conclusions
Germany represents an interesting example for the design of an ICL for tuition fees.
Since 2007, several German states have introduced tuition fees at their universities
and publicly owned banks have started to oer student loans to cover these fees.
Although default insurance is an important income contingent element of these loans,
their design leaves no room for higher tuition fees.
Against this background, this paper compares alternative ICLs for tuition fees
at German universities using data form the German Microcensus 2007. To calculate
repayment 
ows, we estimate age-earnings proles, using linear and unconditional
quantile regression models. We dierentiate between men and women residing in East
and West Germany and calculate separate repayment 
ows for university graduates
16and PhDs. The estimates obtained from the regression models further allow us to
calculate implicit interest rate subsidies and repayment burdens across the earnings
distribution which provide important information about the eciency of alternative
loan schemes.
We demonstrate that the implementation of an income contingent loan system
would broaden the scope for tuition fees at German universities considerably. Since
ICLs require reasonably good knowledge of a former students' income, a collection of
ICLs through the German tax system is essential. Higher tuition fees could generate
a public revenue of about e3-4 billion per year if they were introduced at all public
universities in Germany. Specically, if about 1.4 million students would receive an
ICL to pay tuition fees of e3,500 per year, then a loan recoverability of about 60-80
percent would be sucient to generate this revenue. Given the implicit interest rate
subsidies of the alternative ICLs compared in this paper, these recoverability rates
appear to be realistic.
17Tables and Figures
Table 1.{Tuition fees and public loans
Tuition Nominal Maximum Minimum
State Fees p.a. Bank Interest Debt Net Income
Baden-W urttemberg e500 L-Bank 3.78% e15,000 e1,060
(max. 5.5%)
Bavaria e500 KfW 2.69% e15,000 e1,060
F orderbank (max. 7.75%)
Hamburg (until e375 KfW 2.87% e17,000 e1,060
summer 2008) F orderbank (max. 7.5%)
Hesse (until e500 Landes- 6.16% / 0% e15,000 e1,260
summer 2008) treuhandstelle (max. 7.5%)
Lower Saxony e500 KfW 3.06% e15,000 e1,060
F orderbank (max. 7.5%)
North-Rhine Westfalia e500 NRW.Bank 3.896% e10,000 e1,040
(max. 5.90%)
Saarland (until e500 KfW 0% <2.85% e15,000 e1,060































































































Figure 1: Conventional loan repayment schemes




Scheme 1a 45.18 49.83
Scheme 2a 31.47 37.29
Scheme 3a 0.00 0.00
Scheme 1b 29.84 35.80
Scheme 2b 13.11 20.48
Scheme 3b 0.00 0.00
19Table 3.{Summary statistics, sample of employed and not employed persons
Men Women
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
West Germany
Annual gross earnings 26,444 27,509 10,816 14,770
Annual gross earnings if > 0 33,941 26,774 17,104 15,409
Hourly gross wages 12.30 14.33 7.47 12.14
Hourly gross wages if > 0 15.79 14.44 11.82 13.48
Employed 0.779 0.415 0.632 0.482
Basic qualication (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.076 0.265 0.132 0.338
Secondary school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.025 0.155 0.045 0.207
Vocational diploma (Fachabitur) 0.006 0.076 0.005 0.070
University-entrance diploma (Abitur) 0.023 0.150 0.018 0.132
Vocational qualication (Ausbildungsabschluss) 0.591 0.492 0.633 0.482
Master/Foreman (Meister) 0.087 0.282 0.044 0.205
University of applied science degree 0.087 0.281 0.041 0.198
(Fachhochschulabschluss)
University degree 0.091 0.287 0.077 0.267
PhD 0.015 0.123 0.006 0.078
Age 45.3 10.9 45.9 10.9
Number of observations 70,019 78,201
East Germany
Annual gross earnings 14,672 17,277 10,383 12,247
Annual gross earnings if > 0 21,795 16,975 16,548 11,707
Hourly gross wages 6.97 8.34 6.12 7.72
Hourly gross wages if > 0 10.36 8.26 9.76 7.71
Employed 0.673 0.469 0.627 0.483
Basic qualication (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.029 0.166 0.038 0.191
Secondary school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.034 0.181 0.041 0.197
Vocational diploma (Fachabitur) 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.043
University-entrance diploma (Abitur) 0.017 0.130 0.012 0.110
Vocational qualication (Ausbildungsabschluss) 0.685 0.465 0.701 0.458
Master/Foreman (Meister) 0.066 0.247 0.066 0.249
University of applied science degree 0.064 0.244 0.048 0.213
(Fachhochschulabschluss)
University degree 0.091 0.288 0.086 0.280
PhD 0.014 0.117 0.007 0.081
Age 45.9 11.0 46.6 10.9
Number of observations 20,967 22,428
Note.{Weighted numbers based on weights provided by the Microcensus.
20Table 4.{Summary statistics, sample of employed and not employed
university graduates
Men Women
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
West Germany
Annual gross earnings 49,535 44,685 24,789 26,627
Annual gross earnings if > 0 56,576 43,385 31,666 26,228
Hourly gross wages 20.75 17.40 13.77 21.19
Hourly gross wages if > 0 23.70 16.61 17.59 22.50
Employed 0.876 0.330 0.783 0.412
University degree 0.855 0.352 0.927 0.261
PhD 0.145 0.352 0.073 0.261
Age 45.2 10.7 43.1 10.7
Discipline
Medicine 0.066 0.249 0.076 0.264
Law 0.065 0.247 0.059 0.236
Social sciences 0.055 0.228 0.060 0.238
Humanities 0.076 0.265 0.126 0.332
Sciences 0.400 0.490 0.143 0.350
Business 0.130 0.337 0.082 0.274
Education 0.166 0.372 0.368 0.482
Number of observations 7,459 6,447
East Germany
Annual gross earnings 31,090 28,147 21,786 18,977
Annual gross earnings if > 0 38,878 26,227 27,866 17,063
Hourly gross wages 13.83 12.54 11.19 9.95
Hourly gross wages if > 0 17.29 11.70 14.31 9.05
Employed 0.800 0.400 0.782 0.413
University degree 0.868 0.339 0.928 0.258
PhD 0.132 0.339 0.072 0.258
Age 47.1 11.1 45.1 10.6
Discipline
Medicine 0.069 0.253 0.071 0.257
Law 0.079 0.271 0.056 0.231
Social sciences 0.075 0.264 0.086 0.280
Humanities 0.085 0.279 0.123 0.328
Sciences 0.449 0.497 0.212 0.409
Business 0.070 0.256 0.095 0.293
Education 0.119 0.324 0.291 0.454
Number of observations 2,224 2,085











































































































Figure 2: Average age-earnings proles (in thousands of e)
22Table 5.{Repayment burdens of scheme 3b over the first five years of the
repayment period (percent)
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
University University University University
Degree PhD Degree PhD Degree PhD Degree PhD
Mean
Year 1 9.17 7.04 11.47 9.50 10.18 7.53 16.36 10.28
Year 2 8.02 6.12 10.96 9.21 9.37 6.88 14.76 9.48
Year 3 7.18 5.46 10.53 8.96 8.72 6.37 13.53 8.84
Year 4 6.54 4.95 10.16 8.74 8.20 5.97 12.56 8.33
Year 5 6.03 4.56 9.84 8.54 7.77 5.64 11.78 7.91
Q25
Year 1 39.61 16.16 22.09 22.00 21.99 11.29 77.22 16.00
Year 2 23.52 12.41 20.05 21.04 16.92 9.87 40.01 13.04
Year 3 17.04 10.20 18.53 20.31 13.97 8.86 27.70 11.18
Year 4 13.57 8.75 17.38 19.77 12.04 8.11 21.61 9.91
Year 5 11.41 7.74 16.51 19.40 10.71 7.54 18.02 9.02
Q50
Year 1 11.47 8.93 11.91 7.78 10.66 6.85 17.20 10.37
Year 2 9.88 7.49 11.28 7.85 9.83 6.56 15.33 9.66
Year 3 8.73 6.51 10.76 7.92 9.17 6.32 13.92 9.09
Year 4 7.87 5.79 10.32 7.99 8.62 6.11 12.83 8.61
Year 5 7.21 5.25 9.95 8.06 8.18 5.94 11.96 8.22
Q75
Year 1 6.15 4.67 8.47 6.98 7.84 6.40 9.86 6.35
Year 2 5.61 4.30 8.15 6.69 7.33 5.81 9.17 6.15
Year 3 5.17 4.00 7.87 6.43 6.92 5.34 8.62 5.98
Year 4 4.82 3.76 7.63 6.21 6.57 4.97 8.16 5.82










































































































































































Figure 4: Average repayment schemes, East Germany
24Table 6.{Implicit interest rate subsidies for income contingent loan
schemes (percent)
West Germany
Scheme Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
Men
University degree:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1c 29.0 35.5 30.3 26.8
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2c 13.2 21.8 15.1 10.2
3% real interest, no surcharge 3c 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PhD:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1c 33.0 36.7 34.0 31.5
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2c 17.8 22.8 19.1 15.6
3% real interest, no surcharge 3c 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Women
University degree:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1d 32.3 39.0 32.4 29.6
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2d 18.4 100.0 18.6 14.5
3% real interest, no surcharge 3d 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
PhD:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1d 36.0 100.0 35.1 33.7
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2d 22.4 100.0 21.3 18.9
3% real interest, no surcharge 3d 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
East Germany
Scheme Mean Q25 Q50 Q75
Men
University degree:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1e 30.4 34.1 30.9 28.7
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2e 15.5 20.3 16.1 13.0
3% real interest, no surcharge 3e 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PhD:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1e 33.8 35.9 33.6 32.8
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2e 18.9 21.9 18.8 17.5
3% real interest, no surcharge 3e 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Women
University degree:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1f 34.4 42.9 34.6 30.3
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2f 21.2 31.6 21.4 15.4
3% real interest, no surcharge 3f 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
PhD:
0% real interest, no surcharge 1f 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9
0% real interest, 25% surcharge 2f 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
3% real interest, no surcharge 3f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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26Appendix
Table A1.{Hourly Wage Regression
West East
Men Women Men Women
Secondary school degree 0.268*** 0.186*** 0.162** -0.034
(0.017) (0.016) (0.052) (0.055)
Vocational diploma 0.344*** 0.228*** 0.336** 0.149
(0.033) (0.038) (0.127) (0.142)
University-entrance diploma 0.390*** 0.286*** 0.388*** 0.334***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.075) (0.073)
Vocational qualication 0.238*** 0.155*** 0.195*** 0.053
(0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.046)
Master/foreman 0.444*** 0.289*** 0.377*** 0.170***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.048) (0.048)
University of applied science degree 0.682*** 0.524*** 0.679*** 0.393***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.049) (0.049)
University degree 0.715*** 0.623*** 0.795*** 0.539***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.048) (0.048)
PhD 0.930*** 0.722*** 1.077*** 0.764***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.055) (0.063)
Age 0.052*** 0.005 0.022*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Age2/1000 -0.465*** -0.009 -0.232*** -0.040
(0.025) (0.030) (0.050) (0.056)
Constant 0.890*** 1.873*** 1.353*** 1.879***
(0.045) (0.053) (0.099) (0.109)
R2 0.215 0.093 0.206 0.107
N 54,251 48,938 14,088 13,932
Note.{Weighted regressions based on weights provided by the Microcensus. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
27Table A2.{Annual Earnings Regression
West East
Men Women Men Women
Secondary school degree 0.319*** 0.366*** 0.268*** 0.168**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.053) (0.052)
Vocational diploma 0.386*** 0.486*** 0.491*** 0.417***
(0.038) (0.054) (0.130) (0.109)
University-entrance diploma 0.144*** 0.381*** 0.228** 0.230**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.072) (0.076)
Vocational qualication 0.290*** 0.329*** 0.341*** 0.322***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.046) (0.042)
Master/foreman 0.536*** 0.594*** 0.565*** 0.521***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.048) (0.044)
University of applied science degree 0.809*** 0.940*** 0.896*** 0.807***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.049) (0.046)
University degree 0.859*** 1.070*** 1.014*** 0.944***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.048) (0.044)
PhD 1.179*** 1.279*** 1.363*** 1.345***
(0.021) (0.041) (0.057) (0.065)
Age 0.088*** -0.019*** 0.064*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Age2/1000 -0.898*** 0.198*** -0.739*** -0.508***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.046) (0.054)
Constant 7.770*** 9.484*** 8.033*** 8.331***
(0.045) (0.061) (0.094) (0.104)
R2 0.255 0.145 0.248 0.168
N 54,251 48,938 14,088 13,932
Note.{See Notes to Table A1. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
28Table A3.{Unconditional quantile regression estimates: Annual gross
earnings, West Germany
Men Women
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Secondary school degree 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.261*** 0.317*** 0.441*** 0.333***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.020)
Vocational diploma 0.285*** 0.304*** 0.388*** 0.362*** 0.556*** 0.452***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.041) (0.049) (0.066) (0.059)
University-entrance diploma 0.092*** 0.197*** 0.349*** 0.267*** 0.380*** 0.457***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.034) (0.041) (0.035)
Vocational qualication 0.249*** 0.177*** 0.166*** 0.289*** 0.392*** 0.267***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009)
Master/foreman 0.409*** 0.375*** 0.454*** 0.460*** 0.724*** 0.549***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
University of applied science degree 0.474*** 0.503*** 0.803*** 0.598*** 1.036*** 1.062***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
University degree 0.442*** 0.499*** 0.857*** 0.608*** 1.063*** 1.175***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
PhD 0.486*** 0.570*** 1.070*** 0.608*** 1.202*** 1.402***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.027) (0.036) (0.044)
Age 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.079*** -0.012*** -0.042*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Age2/1000 -0.603*** -0.712*** -0.787*** 0.053 0.437*** -0.170***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.036) (0.045) (0.037)
Constant 8.321*** 8.506*** 8.445*** 9.101*** 10.047*** 9.260***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.044) (0.065) (0.085) (0.070)
R2 0.100 0.166 0.230 0.051 0.090 0.152
N 54,251 54,251 54,251 48,938 48,938 48,938
Note.{See Notes to Table A1. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
29Table A4.{Unconditional quantile regression estimates: Annual gross
earnings, East Germany
Men Women
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Secondary school degree 0.205*** 0.169*** 0.130* 0.131* 0.241*** 0.098**
(0.046) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.035)
Vocational diploma 0.224* 0.403** 0.340* 0.303** 0.526** 0.223
(0.105) (0.132) (0.173) (0.115) (0.182) (0.128)
University-entrance diploma 0.074 0.296*** 0.277*** 0.196** 0.324*** 0.230***
(0.058) (0.053) (0.073) (0.069) (0.081) (0.057)
Vocational qualication 0.275*** 0.236*** 0.124** 0.253*** 0.447*** 0.162***
(0.040) (0.031) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044) (0.026)
Master/foreman 0.386*** 0.465*** 0.402*** 0.423*** 0.728*** 0.275***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.032)
University of applied science degree 0.445*** 0.721*** 1.046*** 0.477*** 1.022*** 0.695***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.050) (0.046) (0.050) (0.036)
University degree 0.447*** 0.750*** 1.175*** 0.500*** 1.086*** 0.834***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.031)
PhD 0.488*** 0.839*** 1.600*** 0.534*** 1.268*** 1.174***
(0.040) (0.034) (0.059) (0.049) (0.056) (0.043)
Age 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.080*** 0.017*** 0.052*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Age2/1000 -0.482*** -0.573*** -0.920*** -0.271*** -0.594*** -0.335***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.066) (0.047) (0.074) (0.054)
Constant 8.555*** 8.319*** 8.222*** 8.776*** 7.941*** 8.958***
(0.079) (0.086) (0.123) (0.095) (0.143) (0.102)
R2 0.067 0.155 0.232 0.069 0.104 0.165
N 14,088 14,088 14,088 13,932 13,932 13,932
Note.{See Notes to Table A1. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
30